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DISCRETION TO DENY INJUNCTION AGAINST
TRESPASS AND NUISANCE

W

By HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK*

the supreme court of Pennsylvania was confronted
in a suit' to enjoin a continuing trespass with the contention of defendant that an injunction was not of right but of grace
and ought to be refused if greater injury would result from its
refusal than from leaving a party to his remedy at law, in support of which an earlier Pennsylvania case 2 was cited, the court
replied:
"The phrase 'of grace' predicated of a decree in equity had its
origin in an age when kings dispensed their royal favors by the
hands of their chancellors, but, although it continues to be repeated
occasionally, it has no rightful place in the jurisprudence of a free
commonwealth, and ought to be relegated to the age in which it
was appropriate. It has been somewhere said that equity has its
laws as law has its equity. This is but another form of saying that
equitable remedies are administered in accordance with rules as
certain as human wisdom can devise, leaving their application
only in doubtful cases to the discretion, not the unmerited favor or
grace of the chancellor. Certainly no chancellor will at this day
admit that he dispenses favors or refuses rightful demands, or
deny that when a suitor has brought his cause clearly within the
rules of equity jurisprudence, the relief he asks is demandable
ex debito justitiae, and needs not to be implored ex gratia." 3
The accuracy of this statement of the origin of the obvious
difference between the administration of the common law by the
common law courts and the administration of equity by the chancellors is not questioned and it ought to be equally beyond question that this historical basis for the difference in administration
HEN

*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
'Walters v. McElroy, (1892) 151 Pa. 549, 25 Atl. 125.

2Richard's Appeal, (1868) 57 Pa. 105, 98 Am. Dec. 202.
3Walters v. McElroy, (1892) 151 Pa. 549, 557, 25 Atl. 125.
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has disappeared from our legal system. Unless, then, there is
some basis other than the historical one for the difference, that
ought also to disappear. It is not altogether clear from the above
quotation, nor from the opinion from which it was taken, whether
the court intended to go to the length of saying that, in equity as
at law, a decree for the plaintiff, awarding him a particular form
of relief, would always be rendered whenever facts which previously had been held to entitle one to that relief were established
to the satisfaction of the trier of the fact issues, or, to restate the
proposition with reference to the specific problem to be considered in this article, that whenever it was satisfactorily established
that defendant was repeatedly or continuously trespassing on the
property of plaintiff and would continue to do so unless enjoined,
or was using his land in such a way as to be a nuisance to plaintiff, and the remedy at law was inadequate either because recovery of damages would not redress the injury or because the effective protection at law would require a multiplicity of suits, then
the court of equity is under the same duty to enjoin the continuance of the trespass or the nuisance, as a court of law would be to
give plaintiff a judgment for damages.
There can be no doubt that the same court did go to that extreme length in Pile v. Pedrick.4 The defendants in that case had
erected a wall within the lines of their own lot as located by a district surveyor. Later surveys disclosed that the line was not correctly located and that, while the wall above ground was all on
defendant's side of the true line, some of the stones in the foundation projected 12 inches over the line into plaintiff's lot. Defendants offered to make the wall a party wall and give plaintiff
free use of it, and when that was refused asked permission to
excavate on plaintiff's side of the wall and chip off the stones
projecting over the line, agreeing to pay all damage suffered by
plaintiff or his tenants. This offer also was refused and plaintiff
sued for an injunction requiring defendants to take down their
entire wall and rebuiid it on their own side of the line. The lower
court granted the injunction prayed for but divided the costs and
both parties appealed. On plaintiff's appeal, the supreme court
held that costs in equity were within the discretion of the chancellor and were disposed of properly. On defendants' appeal, the
court said:
4(1895) 167 Pa. 296,.31 At. 646.
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"The defendants have no right, at law or in equity, to occupy
land that does not belong to them, and we do not see how the
court below could have done otherwise than recognize and act on
this principle."
Other courts also have announced the proposition that relief
in equity is a matter of right and not of grace or of discretion, 5
even though they have not had occasion to apply that principle in
a case which put their adherence to it to such a test as in Pile v.
Pedrick, and this statement has apparently received the approval
of some commentators. 6 The extent to which, if at all, the
discretion which was formerly exercised by the chancellor in
administering the royal prerogative of grace may now be exercised by judges of our courts of equity in granting or refusing
to enjoin a trespass or nuisance, and the principles which should
control the exercise of that discretion, are the questions to be
considered in this article.
I. DiscRETioN N ADmINISTERING EQUITABLE REMEDIES
It has been suggested that discretion in administration is the
characteristic most distinguishing equity from the common law,
and is essential to give law the flexibility required to meet changing conditions.7 But, conceding that there must be some discretion in administration, is there good reason why that discretion
now should obtain to a greater degree in those cases which formerly would have been decided by the chancellor than in cases
before the same court which formerly would have been decided
-in the common law courts? Two reasons suggest themselves. In
the first place the judge of a court of common law can ostensibly
administer the principles of law rigidly, because the fact finding
body, the jury, may be depended on to exercise discretion to the
extent necessary to prevent too great injustice. This element-of
administrative discretion was recoginzed by Lord Coke in the
time of James I." The judge sitting as a chancellor, who must
find the facts himself, cannot so easily conceal a refusal to apply
established rules under a cloak of finding facts.
245,
526,
259,
625,

GHulbert v. California. Portland Cement Co., (1911) 161 Cal. 239,
118 Pac. 928; Wente v. Commonwealth Fuel Co., (1908) 232 II1.
533, 83 N. E. 1049; Currie v. Silvernale, (1919) 142 Minn. 254,
171 N. 'W. 782; Hennessy v. Carmony, (1892) 50 N. J. Eq. 616,
25 Atl. 374.

613 Col. L. Rev. 636; 27 Col. L. Rev. 307; 36 Harv. L. Rev. 211; 57

U. of Pa. Law Rev. 396.
7
Pound, The Decadence of Equity, (1905) 5 Col. L. Rev. 20.
sHixt v. Goates, (1616) 1 Rolle 257.
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But a more important consideration is the nature of the relief
awarded. At common law the judgment for plaintiff ordinarily
awards him the possession of his property, or damage for the loss
he has suffered. It may be that morally defendant has an equal
claim to the property or has committed no act for which he should
be mulcted in damages, but it will rarely, if ever, happen that his
loss is greater than that of plaintiff would be if recovery were
denied. But when we are administering a system in which specific reparation is awarded, it very commonly occurs that to award
such relief would be to impose a burden on defendant out of all
proportion to the benefit which plaintiff would receive. These
situations, which in our Anglo-American legal system are peculiar
to what we know as suits in equity, present similar problems in a
legal system in which our principle that specific redress will be
granted only by a court which administers the King's prerogative of grace is unknown. Thus the Supreme Court of
Canada, in a case 9 arising in Montreal, and after a consideration
of civil, as distinguished from common law, authorities only, held
that, where a wall of a building encroached slightly on the lot of
an adjoining owner, but had been erected with the consent of the
adjoining owner on what both mistakenly thought was the true
line, the court will not compel the demolition of the wall, but will
allow the owner to retain the occupied strip on payment of a reasonable indemnity. The reasoning by which the result is justified
differs from that which a common law court would adopt, but the
result is strikingly similar to that reached by some of our courts
when confronted by the same problem. 0
If we include within the term "discretion" the power of the
court to consider all facts in the particular case in determining
the relief to be given,"1 as distinguished from its duty to grant
9

Delorme v. Cusson, (1897) 28 Can. Sup. Ct. 66.

' 0 See infra, nn. 50-53. It is, however, interesting to note that the
Court cited a Norman decree of 1618, which held that demolition
would not be awarded where the builder had acted in good faith, because, though the rigor of the strict law would require the demolition, the equitable rule, which ought to be followed, regarded the interests of both parties. Delorme v. Cusson, (1897) 28 Can. Sup. Ct.

66, 81.
"Courts have not always used the term in this broad sense, e.g.
in Hennessy v. Carmony, (1892) 50 N. J. Eq. 616, 625, 25 Atd. 374,
Vice Chancellor Pitney refers to a possible meaning as substantially
equivalent to the personal discretion of an officer which is not subject to control by established principles and, therefore, not reviewable. He rightly limits discretion in that sense, in judicial proceedings,
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a specified remedy whenever it determines that certain facts exist,
regardless of the presence of other possible facts, probably no
one would deny that courts of equity should exercise discretion;
certainly all agree that the remedy to which plaintiff would otherwise be entitled may be denied where he has delayed seeking it for
12
a period which, under all the circumstances, amounts to laches.
Even the Pennsylvania court in the repudiation of the doctrine that
relief in equity is a matter "of grace"' 3 apparently recognizes a
discretion to refuse relief in "doubtful cases." The existence
of a discretion in administering equitable remedies, differing in
degree if not in kind from that exercised in administering common law remedies, is, therefore, supportable in reason and well
established by authority.
II. OBJECTIONS TO THE BALANCING OF EQUITIES
But if there is substantial unanimity that courts of equity have
discretion in administration of their remedies, greater than courts
of common law possess, there is great disagreement as to some
of the principles by which that discretion is to be controlled. Our
discussion will be limited to one only of the many principles which
equity courts have at different times suggested, that is the principle
that an injunction against a trespass or nuisance will be refused
where to grant it would cause damage to defendant, greater than
would result to plaintiff from the refusal of the injunction, the
principle frequently called "balancing the equities," or "conveniences," though a more accurate term is "balancing the hardships."
In this article the term "balancing the hardships" will be used to
refer to this weighing of the injuries that will result from the
issuance of the injunction, while the term "balancing the equities"
will be used to include consideration of other factors, such as the
conduct of the respective parties with reference to the transaction. A principle similar to the balancing of hardships is frequently resorted to in suits for specific performance of contracts, 4
to matters affecting procedure only. Not all courts, in rejecting the
doctrine of discretion in administering equitable relief, give us so clear
a statement
of the sense in which that term is used.
' 2 Kinsman v. Utah Gas & Coke Co., (1918) 53 Utah 10, 177 Pac.
418. Laches is a standard to be applied with discretion and not a
fixed rule, except in those cases where equity follows the analogy of
the statute of limitations barring relief at common law for the same
injury.
13See quotation from Walters v. McElroy, supra, p. 565.
' 4For examples of the extent to which courts have gone in denying specific performance of contracts for the sale of land because
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but in many of those cases the problem is complicated by at least
a suspicion that the hard bargain was obtained by some unfair
means, and for that reason it may be argued that different principles should apply.' 5
The situations in which the prificiple of balancing the hardships has been invoked to defeat injunction against trespass or
nuisance have been grouped into three classes:16 (1) The injury
to the plaintiff is small absolutely; (2) The injury to the plaintiff
is large absolutely, but small relatively to the hardship upon the
defendant or others and the defendant has no power of eminent
domain; (3) The situation is like that of the second group, except that the defendant has the power of eminent domain, that.is
the legal privilege of taking the land of another or of damaging
it on payment of compensation. In this last class the question
is one merely of proper procedure to protect the right to damages, which differs essentially from the question whether equity
-will deny the injunction in a case where defendant's act is found
to be a legal wrong. Cases falling within this class are, therefore, outside the scope of this discussion.
In Broadbent v. Imperial Gas Co., 17 the chancellor distin-

guishes an earlier case as holding merely that equity would not
enjoin even an admitted nuisance where the damage was "infinitesimal," the injury in the case referred to being that caused to an
abutting owner by temporary excavation in the street to lay gas
pipes. In Exton v. Glen Gardner Water Co.,"8 a diversion of
of hardship to, the defendant, see Marks v. Gates, (C.C.A. 9th Cir.
1907) 154 Fed. 481; Kelley v. York Cliffs Imp. Co., (1900) 94 Me.
374, 47 Atl. 898; Curran v. Holyoke Water Power Co., (1874) 116
Mass.5 90; Friend v. Lamb, (1893) 152 Pa. 529, 25 Atl. 577.
1 In Bochterle v. Saunders, (1913) 36 R. I. 39, 88 At. 803, specific
performance of a contract to remove an addition to a house which
encroached 18 inches on a private way belonging to plaintiff was
refused on the ground of hardship. It would seem there should be
no distinction between the enforcement of the property right and of
the contract right in such a case. In American Book Co. v. State,
(1927) 216 Ala. 367, 373, 113 So. 592, the court refused to apply the
doctrine of "balancing of convenience" where the state sought to
enjoin breach of a contract not to sell books in other states at a
lower price than in Alabama. In the comment on this case in 22
Ill. Law Rev. 775, most of the cases referred to are cases where
injunction against tort was involved and cases refusing affirmative
specific performance of contracts because of "hardship" were not
discussed.
iOChafee, The Progress of the Law-Equitable Relief Against
Torts, (1921) 34 Harv. L. Rev. 388, 394.
'7(1857) 7 De G., M & G. 436, 462.
18(N.J. Ch. 1925) 129 At. 255. See comment on this case in 24
Mich. L. Rev. 70.
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about four gallons of water per minute for sale to non-riparian
users was enjoined at the suit of lower riparian owners who
used the stream for power, though the diversion diminished complainants' power by only one three-thousandth of a horse power.
The vice chancellor said that "if the diversion is of such a perceptible and sensible amount as not to be excluded under the
maxim 'de minimis,' complainant is entitled to resort to this court
for protection." If we are to accept as universally true Professor
Chafee's statement that in the first class of cases the injunction
will be denied if it would seriously burden defendant, it is
evident we will have to limit the term "absolutely small" to so
few cases that the rule becomes of almost no practical importance.
This is especially true if we accept the proposition that loss of a
legal right which is of no substantial use to the owner, is a substantial injury if the owner could have obtained substantial compensation for his surrender of that right.19 Sometimes the ulterior
object of a suit for injunction is to compel the defendant to buy
off the plaintiff for a substantial amount. 20 The important class
is, therefore, that in which we find cases where the wrong causes
some substantial injury to plaintiff, but where the injunction would
2
inflict a much greater hardship upon defendant. 1
The reason that is probably most often given for refusing to
balance hardships in cases of this class is that indicated by the
Pennsylvania court in the case from which the quotation is made
39 This is the ground on which the court in refusing an injunction
in Cooper v. Crabtree, (1882) 20 Ch. Div. 589, distinguished the earlier
case of Goodson v. Richardson, (1874) 9 Ch. App. 221, in which the
injunction had been granted.
10Edwards v. Allouez M. Co., (1878) 38 Mich. 46, 31 Am. Rep.
301; 2 Hunter v. Carroll, (1888) 64 N. H. 572, 15 Atl. 17.
'No attempt will be made in this article to discuss or even cite
all of the cases in which this question has been considered. Citations of the cases may be obtained from the Decennial Digests, Tit.
Injunction, sections 23, 24, 50, and Tit. Nuisance, section 25 (2); 32
C. J., Tit. Injunctions, 77-83; 29 Cyc. Tit. Nuisances, 1231; 14 R. C. L.
357-360, Tit. Injunctions, sections 60, 61; 20 R. C. L. 480, 481, Tit.
Nuisances, section 93. An elaborate note on the question as related
to nuisances is to be found in 31 L. R. A. (N.S.) 881. See also, 5
Pomeroy, Eq. Jurisprudence, 2d ed., Eq. Rem., sections 1943-1945;
Slaymaker, The Rule of Comparative Injury in the Law of Injunction,
60 Cent. L. J. 23; Chafee, Progress of the Law-Equitable Relief
Against Torts, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 388, 392-394 and notes and comments, 8 Calif. L. Rev. 127, 128; 13 Col. L. Rev. 635; 23 Col. L. Rev.
684; 9 Cornell L. Quar. 63; 14 Harv. L. Rev. 458; 18 Harv. L. Rev.
149; 22 Harv. L. Rev. 61, 596; 28 Harv. L. Rev. 110, 209; 36"Harv.
L. Rev. 211; 2 MINNESoTA LAW REVImw 229; 9 MINNESOTA LAW REVEW
290; 57 U. Pa. L. Rev. 396.
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at the beginning of this article. As we have seen,22 courts of
equity do exercise discretion in other situations, before we can
accept this reason for refusing to balance hardships in exercising
discretion as to injunction against, trespass or nuisance, we must
find some objection to that principle which does not apply in other
cases.,
It frequently is said that to refuse an injunction on the balance
of hardships and thereby compel the injured party to accept damages for invasion of his property right is to permit his property
to be taken or damaged for a private purpose, -which is prohibited
by our constitution. 23 'No case is cited in which it has been de.cided that the constitutional guaranty requires a state to afford
specific prevention of, or redress for, violations of property rights,
but it cannot well be denied that the practical effect of denial of
an injunction is that the property is taken or damaged. It is not,
however, impossible that a "wise social engineering" would prevent a rigid adherence to the principle that no man's property can
be taken or damaged, except for a purpose recognized as public
in our law of eminent domain. While there would be little, if
any, dissent from the proposition that the law ought to protect
property owners from loss resulting from the development of
other industries in the community, there is not the same concurrence in the proportion that it should compel those new industries
either to cease operation or to submit to whatever exaction a neighboring property owner may choose to demand for surrendering
his right to protest.' 4 The United States Supreme Court has held
that the public interest in the development of a state's resources
is sufficient to sustain a statute authorizing condemnation of a right
of way for a private irrigation ditch which will serve only one
user.2 5 That interest is frequently involved in suits to enjoin
nuisances where often the industrial life of a community26 and
22Supra, p. 567. Compare the cases refusing specific performance
of a contract to buy or sell land because of hardship to defendant,

especially Friend v. Lamb, (1893) 152 Pa. 529, 25 Atl. 577.
225

Pomeroy Eq. Jur. 4th ed., 1919, sec. 1944 (Eq. Rem., sec. 531) ; 13

Col. 24L. Rev. 635, and cases cited.

For an extreme illustration of the desire of equity to safeguard
possibility for future development of the community, see Wilkins v.
Diven, (1920) 106 Kan. 283, 187 Pac. 665, where the court not only
refused to enjoin interference with an easement for a water pipe from
a well on an adjoining lot, but also enjoined the owner of the easement from exercising his right to enter to restore the pipe and thereby
compelled
him to accept compensation for the value of the easement.
25
Clark v. Nash, (1905) 198 U. S. 361, 25 Sup. Ct. 676, 49 L. Ed, 1085.
28
Madison v. Ducktown, etc. Co., (1904) 113 Tenn. 769, 83 S. W. 658.
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even the most important industry of a state 27 depends on the continued operation of the plant causing the nuisance and no way is
known by which that operation can be continued without causing
a nuisance. Certainly in these cases the public interest is at least
as great as it is in the condemnation of a right of way for a railroad, even if there is no technical "public use." It has been suggested that the courts ought to leave the protection of that interest
to the legislature.2 8 No reason is stated why the court should wait
for action by the legislature before it exercises a power which it
admittedly possessed when our constitutions were adopted and
which is not claimed to be contrary to any constitutional provision.
It would seem to be clear that the court can and ought to refuse
an injunction where to issue it would cause an injury to the public interests out of all proportion to the injury which is caused to
plaintiff by the tort he seeks to enjoin.
It is perhaps not so clear that the injury to defendant alone
should be balanced against the injury to plaintiff, yet many courts
have not hesitated to refuse an injunction on that ground where
the result has dearly been to permit defendant to occupy plaintiff's property on condition of payment of damages.29 However
sound theoretically the objection may be, it has been disregarded in
practice by courts whose opinions are generally accorded great
weight.30
27

Bliss v. Washoe Copper Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1911) 186 Fed. 789.
Harv. L. Rev. 458, 459.
29Lloyd v. Catlin Coal Co., (1904) 210 Ill. 460, 71 N. E. 335; Lynch
v. Union Inst. for Savings, (1893) 159 Mass. 306, 34 N. E. 364; Hunter v.
Carroll, (1888) 64 N. H. 572, 15 Atl. 17; McCann v. Chasm Power Co.,
(1914) 211 N. Y. 301, 105 N. E. 516.
-2°The United States Supreme Court has apparently not definitely passed
on this question. In McCarthy v. Bunker Hill, etc., Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir.
1909) 164 Fed. 927, the injunction was refused on the balancing of hardships
and certiorari was denied, 212 U. S. 583, 29 Sup. Ct. 692, 53 L. Ed. 660. In
American Smelting etc. Co. v. Godfrey, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1907) 158 Fed. 225,
the injunction was issued notwithstanding a claim of great hardship to defendant and certiorari was also denied, 207 U. S. 597. In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., (1906) 206 U. S. 230, 238, 27 Sup. Ct. 618, 51 L. Ed. 1038.
Mr. Justice Holmes, writing the opinion of the court, says of suits by a State
for an injunction against a nuisance committed in another state: "This court
has not quite the same freedom to balance the harm that will be done by an
injunction against that of which the plaintiff complains, that it would have in
deciding between two subjects of a single political power." In Arizona Copper Co. v. Gillespie, (1912) 230 U. S. 46, 56, 33 Sup. Ct. 1004, 57 L. Ed. 1384,
Mr. Justice Lurton, writing the opinion of the court, says that whether equity will restrain a nuisance depends "upon a variety of circumstances, including the comparative injury by granting or refusing the injunction." The
decree for injunction was affirmed, the court below not having found the
hardship it would cause the defendant.
2814
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Another objection often urged against the balancing of hardships is that the effect of the operation of the rule "would be to
deprive the poor litigant of his little property by giving it to those
already rich,"" or that "it is in effect saying to the wrongdoer,
'If your financial interests are large enough so that to stop you
will cause you great loss, you are at liberty to invade the rights of
your smaller and less fortunate neighbors.' "32
The objection
has great weight if all that is meant by the doctrine is that the
amount of pecuniary injury to defendant shall be balanced against
the amount of pecuniary loss plaintiff sustains from the 'injury, but
the courts which have adopted the doctrine have not followed such
a simple rule as that. Unquestionably one factor to be considered in any balancing of hardships is that public policy which is
"more concerned in the protection of individual rights than in the
33
profits to inure to individuals by the invasion of those rights.1
Conceding the weight of these objections to the balancing of
hardships, is there any reason for applying that doctrine sufficiently cogent to overcome the objections? The experience of
Pennsylvania seems to require an affirmative answer. After first
stating the power of equity to exercise discretion in granting or
denying injunctions as broadly as any court has ever done,3 4 the
courts of that state later changed their attitude and announced the
principle that an injunction was a matter of right whenever it was
clear that a wrong was being committed or threatened and that the
remedy at law was inadequate. 85 In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
8 the court was required to determine, in
Sanderson"
an action for
damages, whether the pollution by mine drainage of a stream from
which plaintiff obtained his domestic water supply was a nuisance.
In connection with a comment on the importance of the mining
industry to the state and the impossibility of carrying it on without
draining the polluted waters from the mines into the surface
streams, the court remarked, as an added reason for holding there
was no nuisance:
O'Whalen
v. Union Bag Co., (1913) 208 N. Y. 1, 5, 101 N. E. 805.
32

Arizona Copper Co., Ltd. v. Gillespie, (1909) 12 Ariz. 190, 204, 100
Pac. 405."
33
McCleery v. Highland Boy Gold Min. Co., (D.C. 1904) 140 Fed. 951,
952.
34
Richard's Appeal, (1868) 57 Pa. 105, 98 Am. Dec. 202; Huckenstine's
Appeal, (1871) 70 Pa. 102, 10 Am. Rep. 669.
3
5Walters v. McElroy, (1892) 151 Pa. 549, 25 Atl. 125; Sullivan v.
Jones & L. Steel Co., (1904) 208 Pa. 540, 57 Atl. 1065.
36(1886) 113 Pa. 126, 6 Atl. 453.
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"Indeed, if the right to damages in such cases is admitted,
equity may and under the decisions of this court undoubtedly
would, at the suit of any riparian owner, take jurisdiction, and,
upon the ground of a continuous and irreparable injury, enjoin
the operation of the mine altogether."3 7
In a later suit38 by a plaintiff who had conveyed the coal under
his land without waiving the right to support of the surface,
the court was asked to enjoin the removal of the coal in such manner as would damage the surface. Earlier cases had determined
that the plaintiff had a right to such support; the court had no discretion as to the remedy nor as to the legal right; it avoided the
issuance of an injunction which it felt would be unjust by holding
that the remedy at law was adequate.
Still later the court was asked to enjoin the further operation
of a large electric power plant which supplied light and power to
the Pittsburgh district, and which had been erected adjacent to
plaintiff's nursery. 30 The court found that the power plant could
not be operated without injuring the nursery by the deposit of
soot and other chemical products of combustion thereon. It quoted
with approval from Richard's Appeal" and Huckenstines Appeal,41 refused to determine whether the nursery could be condemned and concluded:
"We plant our conclusion on the broader general ground, taken
by the court below, that it would not be the part of wisdom, under
the facts shown by the record before us, to enjoin the depositing
of the substances which are the results of the combustion of bituminous coal in the Pittsburgh district, that the injury which would
result from such action, as applied to defendant, furnishing power
and light to the manifold interests it does, would be incalculably
greater than that which will happen from refusing it, and leaving
plaintiff to its legal remedy, it not being shown by such testimony
as should appeal to a court of equity that there are appliances procurable by defendant,
the installation of which would minimize
42
plaintiff's damages.

The attempt to eliminate discretion in the administration of the
remedy of injunction led to the denial of all relief in one case by
inducing the conclusion that the injury was not a nuisance, then
to the obvious fiction that the legal remedy was adequate, and
37(1886) 113 Pa. 126, 144, 6 Atl. 453.
3
3 Berkey v. Berwind-White Coal M. Co., (1908) 220 Pa. 65, 69 At. 329.
1Elliott Nursery Co. v. Duquesne Light Co., (1924) 281 Pa. 166, 126
At. 345.
40(1868) 57 Pa. 105, 98 Am. Dec. 202.
41(1871) 70 Pa. 102, 10 Am. Rep. 669.
4*-(1924) 281 Pa. 166, 176, 177, 126 Atl. 345.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

finally was abandoned by the court which had announced it after
careful consideration of earlier cases to the contrary. No better
demonstration could be asked of the practical necessity for preserving the discretion of equity.
These objections are usually stated as applying only to the
balancing of hardships. The one last mentioned is so limited but
it is not clear why the objections that equitable relief is a matter
of right and not of discretion, and that a denial of injunction permits a taking for a private use do not apply to any balancing of
equities, which do not affect the rights involved. No serious contention has ever been made that plaintiff's personal conduct may
not warrant the denial of equitable relief to him, though it does
not warrant interference by equity with his pursuit of his remedies
at common law.
III. How TO WEIGH THE EQUITIES
The opinions of the courts are of little help in determining the
factors to be considered in balancing equities when an injunction
is sought. The tendency is strong, as we have seen in the case of
Pennsylvania, when the court decides to issue the injunction to
deny its power to balance equities, and, when it decides to refuse
the injunction, to stress the injury from its issuance and either
ignore or minimize the injury to plaintiff from the trespass or
nuisance. 43 It has been suggested that the courts which deny their
power to balance equities, really are applying a more critical balancing by according weight to the preservation of individual rights.
This is undoubtedly true in many cases, but a distinction must be
drawn between a determination that, as a matter of law, the right
of an individual to the undamaged enjoyment of his property is
superior to the right of an owner of an adjacent tract to conduct
thereon a lawful business the consequence of which would be to
injure the enjoyment of the former, and the determination, as a
matter of discretion, that the injury to the plaintiff, including consideration of his legal right, to unimpaired enjoyment, outweighs
the injury the injunction would inflict on defendant or the public.
When the federal court adopted the statement that "The rights of
43In the opinion in the case of Elliott Nursery Co. v. Duquesne L. Co.,
(1924) 281 Pa. 166, 126 Al. 345, we are not told what the effect of refusing
the injunction would be on plaintiff's nursery. Would it make its operation
merely less profitable or impossible so as to compel its abandonment or
removal?

DISCRETION TO DENY INJUNCTION

habitation are superior to the rights of trade, and whenever they
conflict, the rights of trade must yield to the primary right,"4
it was ostensibly announcing a rule of law, not a principle which
ought to govern the exercise of discretion. When the Minnesota
court said that the same statement "is the better doctrine, and that
ordinarily it should be applied in determining whether an injunction should be granted or denied 45 it was balancing equities.
How many courts which adopt the former mode of expression
really intend the latter we have no means of ascertaining.
But if we cannot rely very much on the opinions of the courts,
some generalizations may be attempted as to what courts have
actually done in the way of balancing equities, what facts they have
stressed as distinguishing certain cases from others. It ought to
be universally conceded that the court can balance equities in determining the terms of an injunction, but some courts apparently
act on the theory expressed by a Minnesota trial court that relief
must be wholly denied or defendant's business destroyed.4 6 At
least time may be given in which defendant can adjust himself to
the situation if such adjustment is possible.4 7 Where plaintiff can,
without great hardship, avoid the injurious consequences, equity,
if it can exercise any discretion, ought not to grant an injunction
which will impose great hardship on defendant if the latter will
pay the damages sustained by plaintiff and the cost of the works
which will avoid the consequence in the future. 48 It is, of course,
4"American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Godfrey, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1907) 158
Fed. 225, 229, quoting from Wood, Nuisances, sec. 514.
45Brede v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Co., (1919) 143 Minn. 374, 379,
173 46
N. W. 805.
Brede v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Co., (1919) 143 Minn. 374, 382,
173 N.
4 W. 805.
7Sammons v. City of Gloversville, (1903) 175 N. Y. 346, 67 N. E. 622.
But in Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., (1911) 161 Calif. 239,
118 Pac. 928, the court refused to stay an injunction against the operation
of a cement plant because the dust from it was a nuisance to neighboring
orchards, pending the determination of an appeal, though the company, in
support of its motion, represented that it was then constructing a process
with all diligence which it believed would prevent the escape of dust. The
opinion relies on authorities holding that an injunction may not be denied
on balance of hardships without any recognition that many of the reasons
advanced
did not apply to a delay of injunction.
48
Rosser v. Randolph, (1838) 7 Port. (Ala.) 238, where an injunction
against operating a mill was refused on the ground that the spring from
which plaintiff derived his domestic water supply, and which was flooded
by the mill dam, could be protected by easily constructed works. An injunction against polluting a stream with salt, rendering it unfit for use in a
steam boiler was refused where it appeared plaintiff could obtain suitable
water from another convenient source, or render the stream water suitable
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obvious without regard to balance of equities that the injunction
should never place any greater restriction on defendant than is nec-9
essary to protect plaintiff from the injury of which he complains.4
In suits to compel the removal of structures which encroach on
the property of others, many courts refuse the injunction if the
defendant acted innocently and great hardship would result to
defendant but grant it regardless of the balance of hardships if
the encroachment was willful. ° This rule is followed in New
York and Massachusetts, though in other cases the courts of those
states have refused to consider the balance of hardship as a ground
for denying an injunction against a nuisance.5' The Massachusetts court, which balances hardships where the encroachment is
innocent,12 refused to consider defendant's hardship where he
merely directed his builder not to go over the line after he knew
there was a disagreement between him and the adjoining owner as
to the location of the line. 3 No other courts apparently have considered the effect of a negligent encroachment by defendant. Perhaps the cases which refuse to balance hardships when an injunction against a nuisance is sought may be reconciled with these cases
on the ground that defendant knows, or ought to know, that his
acts will constitute a nuisance. Some of the opinions in nuisance
for such use at a reasonable and ascertainable expense. Salem Iron Co. v.
Hyland, (1906) 74 Oh. St. 160, 77 N. E. 751. In an action for damages
and an injunction against collecting surface water and discharging it at
one point on a lower owner, an instruction that the lower owner should prevent the injury if he could do so at small expense was held erroneous as
a matter of law in Paddock v. Somes, (1890) 102 Mo. 226, 238, but it was
also held to be unsupported by any evidence that plaintiff could have avoided
the injury.
4
9In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., (1916) 237 U. S. 474, 35 Sup.
Ct. 631, 59 L. Ed. 1054, 240 U. S. 650, 36 Sup. Ct. 465, 60 L. Ed. 846, the
court fixed the amount of sulphur fumes which defendant might discharge
into the air during a trial period and at the expiration of the trial period
made a final decree on the basis of the observed results of the trial period.
See, also, note on Nebulous Injunctions, 19 Mich. L. Rev. 83.
505 Pomeroy Equity, 2d ed., Eq. Rem. sec. 1919, and cases cited. But in
Barker v. Mintz, (1923) 73 Colo. 262, 215 Pac. 534, wilful trespass to the
surface by an owner of underlying coal was not enjoined because of relative
hardship. See comments in 23 Col. L. Rev. 684; 33 Yale L. Jour. 205.
5'Compare Crocker v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., (1901) 61 App. Div.
226, 70 N. Y. Supp. 492 with Whalen v. Union Bag Co., (1913) 208 N. Y.
1, and Methodist E. Soc. v. Akers, (1897) 167 Mass. 492, 46 N. E. 381 with
Parker
v. American Woolen Co., (1907) 195 Mass. 591, 81 N. E. 468.
52
Lynch v. Union Inst. for Savings, (1893) 159 Mass. 306, 34 N. E.
364; Methodist E. Soc. v. Akers, (1897) 167 Mass. 560, 46 N. E. 381;
Harrington v. fcCarthy, (1897) 169 Mass. 492, 48 N. E. 278, 61 Am. St.
Rep. 298.
55
Kershishian v. Johnson, (1911) 210 Mass. 135, 96 N. E. 56.
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cases have stressed such knowledge by defendant.5 4 Those cases
which balance hardships where it is doubtful whether a nuisance
in fact exists may then be explained as cases where it is not reasonable to say that defendant knew, or ought to have known, that
his acts would create a nuisance. 55 Conversely the court in refusing to issue the injunction has often emphasized the endeavors of
defendant to avoid a nuisance. Thus where it appeared that a
corporation operating a smelter, on receiving complaints that fumes
from its plants were injuring adjoining agricultural lands, settled
for the damage caused to that time and expended $750,000 in constructing works to prevent the escape of fumes, the court balanced hardships and refused an injunction though the nuisance,
while lessened, was not entirely eliminated.5 6 Again where a large
power plant embodied the latest devices for preventing the escape
of soot and smoke, and it appeared those devices were largely, but
not entirely, successful, the hardships were balanced.5 7 We may
conclude then that the moral guilt or innocence of the defendant is
one factor to be considered in balancing equities.
It is still more evident that the conduct of plaintiff is another
factor. No court denies that the hardship an injunction would
cause to defendant is decisive in many cases in determining
whether delay by plaintiff in asserting his rights has amounted to
"4Weston Paper Co. v. Pope, (1900) 155 Ind. 394, 57 N. E. 719; Strobel

v. Kerr Salt Co., (1900) 164 N. Y. 303, 58 N. E. 142; Whalen v. Union Bag
Co., (1913) 208 N. Y. 1, 101 N. E. 805. These cases all involved diversion
or pollution of water. But many of the cases refusing to order removal of
encroachments on the ground of hardship to an innocent defendant, state
the rule as applying to mandatory injunctions and similar statements have

been made with reference to mandatory injunctions where encroachments
are not involved. See Hill v. Kimball, (1915) 269 Ill. 398, 110 N. E. 18. Do
we not have here merely a following of precedents established when the
courts were more reluctant to grant mandatory than prohibitory injunctions?
GParker v. Lake Winnipiogee Lake Cotton & Woolen Co., (1862) 2
Black (U.S.) 545; Demarest v. Hardham, (1881) 34 N. J. Eq. 469; Powell
v. Bentley & G. Furn. Co., (1891) 34 W. Va. 804, 12 S. E. 1085; Salvin v.
North Brancepeth Coal Co., (1874) L. R. 9 Ch. 705. In Sullivan v.
Jones & L. Steel Co., (1904) 208 Pa. 540, 552, 57 Atl. 1065, in which
the court refused to balance hardships, the court pointed out the inconclusive character of the evidence as to nuisance in Huckenstine's Appeal,
(1871) 70 Pa, 102, 10 Am. Rep. 669, in which the injunction had been
refused. It is more probable that these cases are to be explained as a
survival of the former rule that the existence of a nuisance from the
conduct of a lawful business must be established at law before equity
would enjoin. That is quite obviously the basis of the decision by the
U. S. Supreme Court in the case first cited in this note.
°'Bliss v. Washoe Copper Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1911) 186 Fed. 789.
57
Elliott Nursery Co. v. Duquesne L. Co., (1924)

Atl. 345.

281 Pa. 166, 126
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laches. 58 So the fact that plaintiff bought lower riparian land for
the purpose of compelling defendant to buy him off at a big price
was held to defeat his right to an injunction against depositing
mine refuse in the stream which would impose great hardship on
defendant. 59 Again a mandatory injunction for the removal of
an encroaching wall was denied because plaintiff refused to permit defendant to enter plaintiff's land and remove a shed in order
to make the necessary alterations in the wall and it would impose
unnecessary hardship on defendant to compel him to make the
alteration without entry on plaintiff's land.60
Where the decree cannot be framed so as to avoid hardship to
defendant and still protect plaintiff, and where there is no inequitable conduct of either party, there are still factors that may be considered aside from the mere pecuniary valdes involved. The court
may well take into consideration the extent to which the use of
the respective properties will be affected by the issuance or refusal
of the injunction. If the use of plaintiff's property is not prevented but only rendered slightly less valuable, while the injunction
would prevent the only economically valuable use of defendant's
property the court should deny the injunction. 61
58Simmons v. City of Patterson, (1900) 60 N. J. Eq. 385, 45 At. 995.
59
Edwards v. Allouez M. Co., (1878) 38 Mich. 46, 31 Am. Rep. 301.
Compare McCann v. Chasm Power Co., (1914) 211 N. Y. 301, 105 N. E.
416, where the court in refusing an injunction against -raising the water
on the land of upper riparian owners, stressed the fact that plaintiffs were
officers of, or stockholders in, defendant company and had bought the upper
land after they had participated in erecting the dam.
60
Tramonte v. Calarusso, (1926) 256 Mass. 299, 152 N. E. 90. In a
comment on this case in 27 Col. L. Rev. 100 it is said the only other case
in which the question of similar conduct by plaintiff was shown was Pile
v. Pedrick,
(1895) 167 Pa. 296, 31 Atl. 646 supra, note 4.
6
'Where the mill pond of defendant was shown by the evidence to
render plaintiff's residence slightly less healthful, but not to make it uninhabitable, injunctions were denied on the ground of hardship to defendant
and the community dependent on the mill. Attorney General ex rel.

Eason v. Perkins, (1831) 17 N. Car. 38; Attorne; General ex rel. Bradsher, (1844) 38 N. C. 301; Wilder v. Strickland, (1856) 55 N. C. 386;
Daugherty v. Warren, (1881) 85 N. C. 136. So, llso, where there is an
obstruction to the flow of a stream, found by the jury to be a nuisance but

which damaged plaintiff's land only to the extent of $25 a year, Brown v.
Caroline Central R. Co., (1880) 83 N. C. 128. The language in
these cases justifies the statement that in all cases in North Carolina injury
to the public from an injunction justifies the chancellor in withholding
it. An injunction against raising the water in a stream on adjoining land
was refused where the banks were perpendicular so the only injury to
plaintiffs was loss of head for power purposes and they were not making
that use. McCann v. Chasm Power Co., (1914) 211 N. Y. 301, 105 N. E.
416. Contra Parker v. American Woolen Co., (1907) 191 Mass. 591, 81
N. E. 468.
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The character of the uses to which the land is devoted may be
considered. One whose dwelling is rendered unfit for habitation
is entitled to greater consideration in the balancing of equities than
one who is prevented from conducting on particular premises a
business which he might equally well conduct elsewhere. 62 The
case in which the supreme court of Pennsylvania most emphatically
rejected the principle of balancing hardships as a ground for refusal to enjoin a nuisance was one where the injury was to residences,'6 3 while the subsequent case in which the principle was
applied dealt with an injury to a business. 6 4 It may be doubted
whether a present day balancing of interests would sustain this
distinction but it was strongly entrenched in our legal thinking at
a time when most men retained their homes long enough to become
deeply attached to them, something denied to most of us today.
Where both uses are commercial, their relative value has been considered.65
There still remain a few cases, in which the solution of the
problem is the most difficult, those in which it is clear that the
refusal of the injunction will result in plaintiff losing all substantial use of his property, and that its issuance will have a similar
effect on defendant. In those cases the fact that the pecuniary
value of defendant's property greatly exceeds that of plaintiff's
ought not to be controlling, but can we and ought we to expect the
judge to disregard the indirect consequences to the community of
the issuance of the injunction? While the law ought to attach
great importance to the protection of the property right of plaintiff
from injury, it cannot be overlooked that the consequences of
,closing defendant's plant may be disastrous to hundreds, perhaps
thousands, who will thereby lose their means of livelihood, an interest which there is much reason to believe has not yet been adequately recognized by the law, and many of them, and others also,
will lose all that they have invested in residence property or busi02

Brede v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Co., (1919) 143 Minn. 374, 173
N. W.
805.
63
Sullivan v. Jones & L. Steel Co., (1904) 208 Pa. 540, 57 Atl. 1065.
64Elliott Nursery Co. v. Duquesne L. Co., (1924) 281 Pa. 166, 126
Atl. 65
345.
Baker v. Mintz, (1923) 73 Colo. 262, 215 Pac. 534, where defendant
owned the coal under land whose surface was useful only for stock grazing and the coal could not be economically mined except by stripping the
surface soil. The injunction was refused, because of the slight relative value
of plaintiff's use for grazing.
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ness which will become worthless when there ai-e no longer employees of defendant to occupy, or patronize it.
In any attempt to solve this problem, and indeed properly to
balance the other factors that may be present in the particular
case, the courts ought not to be compelled to act solely on their
individual conceptions of the relative importance of those factors,
or to depend on the partisan claims of the parties before it. Here
would seem to be a case in which a study of the "law of action"
would be of great benefit.6 6 A scientific survey of the consequences which have followed the issuance or refusal of injunctions
against trespass and nuisances would give us information which
would be of great use in the future in determining how equity may
properly exercise its discretion in the administration of "its strongest arm.

'6 7

IV.

CONCLUSION

The results of this study of the problem may be summarized as
follows:
1. Courts of equity have a discretion, on considerations both
of authority and practical necessity, in the administration of their
remedies by way of specific redress, greater than that possessed
by courts of common law in the administration of the common
law remedies of recovery of possession of property or of damages for a wrong.
2. Notwithstanding the theoretical objections urged against
it, experience has shown that equity must balance the equities, including a balancing of hardships, in determining whether to issue
or refuse an injunction against a trespass or nuisance.
66
The reports give us a glimpse of the results in one case. In Whalen
v. Union Bag Co., (1913) 208 N. Y. 1, 101 N. E. 805, an injunction against
pollution of a stream by a pulp mill was reinstated after the decree issuing
it had been reversed by the appellate division (1911) 145 App. Div. 1, 129
N. Y. S. 391. Apparently the lower court thought the pollution could, be
avoided for it stayed the operation of the injunction for one year to give
opportunity for that. See dissenting opinion, 145 App. Div. 1, 129 N. Y. S.
391, 395. But in Driscoll v. American Hide & Leather Co., (1918) 102
Misc. Rep. 612, 170 N. Y. S. 121, a suit to enjoin pollution of the same
stream by another, the court said, p. 122, that as a result of the earlier case,
the Union Bag mill, which represented an investment of more than $1,000,000 had been shut down ever since 1913. No information is given us as
to the loss inflicted on the 400 or 500 employees of that mill, thus thrown
out of work in a community which probably did not have other industries
large67enough to employ more than a few of them.
Coombs v. Lenox Realty Co., (1913) 111 Me. 178, 181, 88 Atl. 477.
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3. The court should balance equities, including balancing
hardships, in settling the terms of the injunction; the conduct of the
respective parties with reference to the transaction is an important
equity to be considered; the proportion of the 'use of plaintiff's
property which will be lost if the injunction is denied may be
compared with the proportion of use of defendant's property
which the injunction will destroy; the character of the uses may be
considered, a use for residence purposes being accorded greater
protection than a use for business; and, in cases where the result
must be either the substantial loss of the entire use of either the
plaintiff's or defendant's property, the mere pecuniary value of
the respective properties is not decisive, but even in these cases
the court cannot disregard the possible injury to the community.
All of these principles of balancing of equities call for exact
information as to the social and economic consequences of the possible decisions from which a choice must be made, information
which can be supplied only by a scientific survey of the results of
the decisions reached in earlier cases.

